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Physicians are key personnel in a sector which is important due to its size as well as 
the quality of service it provides. We estimate the labor supply of physicians 
employed at hospitals in Norway, using personnel register data merged with other 
public records. A dynamic labor supply equation is estimated using a sample of 1303 
physicians  observed over the period 1993-97. The methods of estimation are GMM 
and system GMM. We reject the static model in favor of a dynamic model and obtain 
a long-run wage elasticity of about 0.55. This is considerably higher than previously 
estimated for physicians, in particular for those who are not self-employed. 
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1.  Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the labor supply of physicians in Norway. Thus we 
provide insight into the behavior of key personnel in a sector that is important due to the 
quality of service it provides, as well as the fraction of GDP that is spent on health 
expenditures.  There are relatively few studies of the labor market for the medical profession, 
and those that exist tend to focus on physicians in private practice. Our addition to previous 
research is a study of the labor supply of physicians employed by Norwegian hospitals. 
Besides its relevance for labor markets in the health sector per se, a study of physicians may 
provide insight into the behavior of high-income employees in general. 
  A significant amount of the research on physician behavior relates to physician-
induced demand for services, e.g., Hay and Leahy (1982), Headen (1990), McGuire and Pauly 
(1991). There is also a literature on physician practice patterns, including Gaynor and Pauly 
(1990), Lee (1990), Ferrall et al. (1998). The relatively few papers on supply include Sloan 
(1975) and Noether (1986). A relatively recent application is Rizzo and Blumenthal (1994), 
who focus on the impact of wage and non-wage income for a sample of self-employed US 
physicians. They find an uncompensated wage elasticity for male doctors of 0.23, with a 
compensated substitution elasticity of 0.44. Showalter and Thurston (1997) focus on tax 
effects on labor supply for physicians, as an example of the response of high-income 
individuals. A key finding is that self-employed physicians are sensitive to the marginal tax 
rate, with a supply elasticity of 0.33, whereas the effect is small and insignificant for 
employee physicians. 
  In this study we estimate the labor supply of 1303 physicians employed at Norwegian 
hospitals over a five-year period: 1993-97. The data are constructed by combining 
information on wages and hours worked from a personnel register with administrative 
individual information. We focus on labor supply conditional on working. Even though the   3
strongest effect of wages are at the extensive margin (Heckman 1993), this may be less of an 
issue for physicians.
1  Since physicians belong to the group of high-income individuals, the 
question remains whether there is a positive labor supply response to wage increases at all, or 
if the income effect dominates the substitution effect. As noted above, previous results find 
that the wage elasticities of physicians who are not self-employed are modest. 
  The general literature on labor supply is vast. In their recent overview, Blundell and 
MaCurdy (1999) point out that some confusion exists as to what kind of wage elasticities are 
estimated when different studies are compared – the researcher should be explicit as to 
whether inter- or intratemporal substitution effects are modeled. Following the seminal work 
by Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) and MaCurdy (1981), a branch of the labor supply 
literature has developed which considers life cycle effects. Estimation of life cycle models is 
facilitated by the availability of panel data, see the survey in Laisney et al. (1996). The 
purpose of this study is not to estimate a full life cycle labor supply model; specifically we do 
not consider intertemporal substitution effects. Having access to panel data, we formulate a 
model that does not require myopic agents, and therefore uses a framework that is consistent 
with a life cycle model. 
  We proceed with an account of relevant features of the Norwegian health sector and 
health labor markets in the next section. Section 3 describes our empirical approach, while 
Section 4 gives an overview of the data. Section 5 presents our results and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2.  Background 
At $2362 per capita in 2000, Norwegian total health expenditures are above the OECD 
average ($1967), but way below the US ($4631) and Switzerland ($3222). The health sector is 
                                                 
1 In a companion paper, Askildsen et al. (2002), nurses’ labor supply is estimated using data from the same 
sources, with a focus on the selectivity that follows from participation decisions.   4
predominantly public, with governmental expenditures in 2000 amounting to 85.2%, as 
compared to the OECD average of 71.5%. Despite the expenditure level, the physician 
density (2.7 per 1000 in 1998) is at the OECD average, a fact that may be partly explained by 
the cost driving effects of a scattered population.
2 
  With few exceptions, Norwegian hospitals are owned and run by the public 
authorities, typically by counties. However, a recent (2002) reform transferred ownership of 
all publicly owned hospitals to the central government. An important exception are two large 
hospitals in the capital, Oslo. These hospitals were run by the central government before 
2002. In the Norwegian nomenclature, hospitals are grouped according to functions and 
responsibilities. Local hospitals with chirurgical, medical, and gynecological wards; County 
hospitals (the term refers to functions and not to ownership) with more specialties, e.g. 
neurological wards; and “Central hospitals” with a longer list of capacities. Finally, there are 
five “regional hospitals” with the highest level of specialties, including one in Oslo owned by 
the central government. 
Centralized negotiations and powerful unions characterize the Norwegian labor market. 
This is also the case for physicians, who are represented by The Norwegian Medical 
Association, whose members include 94% of the physician population. As of 2002, about 
55% of Norwegian physicians were employed by hospitals. Self-employed physicians are 
largely dependent on National Insurance reimbursements, which are negotiated centrally, as 
are the tariffs for physicians employed by hospitals or other public services. Still there is room 
for local variation among hospitals, for example in the scheduling of overtime work. Until the 
reform in 2002 which transferred ownership to the central government, the physicians’ 
association’s main counterpart in wage negotiations pertaining to hospitals was The 
Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities. In addition, wages for those 
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Medical Association, the OECD estimate of Norwegian physician density is too low.   5
employed by the state were negotiated with representatives for the central authorities. At the 
local level, physicians follow schedules that typically involve a certain amount of “extended 
hours”, i.e. the work schedule involves more than “normal” hours per week, with 
compensation. This “planned over-time” varies across hospitals and is not necessarily 
renegotiated when the central tariffs change. In addition, there may be demand for over-time 
due to vacancies, sick-absence etc. Thus, even though hospital physicians are public servants, 
there is variation in wages as well as in hours demanded and supplied. 
 
3.  Econometric approach 
3.1 Economic model 
We formulate a labor supply equation that is consistent with a life cycle model, where the 
period labor supply is the outcome of a two-stage budgeting process, see Blundell and 
MaCurdy (1999), Blundell and Walker (1986).
3 Assume that physicians have period t utility 
functions, u(ct, lt, Ψ t) over a composite consumption good (ct, the numeraire) and leisure (lt). 
Ψ t is a vector of “taste shifter” characteristics that may affect consumption decisions. 





t t t t t s y w l w c − + = + τ , 
 
where w denotes the wage rate, τ  is the time constraint, s is net saving, and y
n is non-labor 
income, net of asset income. Letting At denote period t assets (as measured at the end of the 
period) and rt period t interest rate, savings are given by  
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In the first stage of the maximization, wealth is allocated over the life cycle to keep the 
marginal utility of wealth constant. In the second stage, for each period t utility is maximized 
subject to current prices and the wealth (full income) allocated to that period in the first stage. 
This gives period t labor supply (ht ≡  τ  – lt) as  ) , , ( t t t t Ψ Y w h h = , where  t
n
t t s y Y − = . In the 
empirical specification we use a frequently applied formulation, 
 
(3)  ) exp( ) ( t t t t Ψ Y w h η ϕ
α + = . 
 
It is easy to verify, by using Roy’s identity, that (3) is consistent with the additive indirect 
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  Equation (3) is the uncompensated (Marshallian) labor supply function, and α  is the 
wage elasticity. Using the Slutsky equation, the income compensated (Hicksian) response to a 
wage change may be derived as  ) ( t w t h h
t ϕ
α − . Standard consumer theory places no restrictions 
on α , but implies that Hicksian supply be non-negative (i.e., that the demand for leisure be 
non-positive) in the wage rate. This condition holds if  t th w ϕ α ≥ .  
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3.2 Econometric specification and estimation 
In the econometric specification we introduce individual subscripts and allow for 
unobservables by writing  it i it it X Ψ ε µ β η + + = , where Xit are observable characteristics. µ i   
is an individual specific effect and may be correlated with Xit and/or Yit. The remainder ε it is 
assumed to be white noise. As noted in Section 2, wages are negotiated centrally each year 
but that does not necessarily mean that a physician is able to adjust his work schedule 
immediately following a wage change. We incorporate this element in the model by assuming 
that physician i’s desired supply of hours is given by (3), denoted by an asterisk. In natural 
logs, 
 
(5)  it i it it it it X Y w h ε µ β ϕ α β + + + + + = ln ln 0
* . 
 
We then impose a simple partial adjustment mechanism, 
 
(6)  1 0 ), ln (ln ln ln 1 ,
*
1 , ≤ < − = − − − θ θ t i it t i it h h h h , 
 
where a lack of asterisk indicates realized hours. Combining (5) and (6) gives the estimable 
equation 
 
(7)  it i it it it t i it e f X Y w h h + + + + + + = − β ϕ α γ β
~ ~ ln ~ ln
~
ln 1 , 0 , 
 
with  it it i i e f θε θµ θϕ ϕ θα α θβ β θ γ = = = = = − = , , ~ , ~ ,
~
, 1 0 0 . The parameters of (5) are easily 
recovered by dividing  γ β ϕ α − 1 by   
~
  and   , ~ , ~ . We also note that a “standard” model with all   8
adjustment taking place within each period is nested in our set-up. This corresponds to the 
case where γ  = 0, and is a testable hypothesis. 
  For estimation, we note that Yit includes Ait, which is an outcome of the choice process 
and is therefore endogenous. Previous values are predetermined and are therefore valid 
instruments. If yit
n includes spouse income (as it will in this application), presumably the 
couple’s labor supply decisions are not independent. Then this element is endogenous, too, 
and must be instrumented.
4 Due to the way the data are constructed, wage is also endogenous. 
Equation (7) is a dynamic linear panel data model and may be estimated by GMM-methods 
that have now become standard. First, the equation is first-differenced to get rid of the fixed 
effect fi, which may be correlated with some of the right hand side variables. With T time 
periods, the estimating equation becomes  
 
(8)  T t e X Y w h h it it it it t i it ,..., 2 ,
~ ~ ln ~ ln ln 1 , = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ − β ϕ α γ , 
 
where ∆  is the difference operator: ∆ lnhi,t = lnhi,t – lnhi,t− 1 etc. In this equation, ∆ lnhi,t− 1 = 
lnhi,t− 1 −  lnhi,t− 2 is correlated with ∆ eit = eit −  ei,t− 1, but lnhi,t-s and ∆ lnhi,t-s are uncorrelated with 
∆ eit and are valid instruments for s ≥  2 (serial correlation has been ruled out by assumption).  
  Arellano and Bond’s (1991) GMM estimator, which will be employed here, exploits 
all possible moment restrictions in levels for each period t ≥  3. The number of available 
restrictions increases with t:  
 
etc.   , 0 ) ln ( , 0 ) ln ( , 0 ) ln ( : 5
0 ) ln ( , 0 ) ln ( : 4
, 0 ) ln ( : 3
3 5 2 5 1 5
2 4 1 4
1 3
= ∆ = ∆ = ∆ =
= ∆ = ∆ =
= ∆ =
i i i i i i
i i i i
i i
h e E h e E h e E t
h e E h e E t
h e E t
 
                                                 
4 In the estimation, the elements of Yit will be entered as separate variables.   9
 
The validity of the over-identifying restrictions may be tested using a Sargan test. If the ε it 
(and thus eit) are serially uncorrelated, then the residuals in the first-differenced model are 
first-order-correlated, but should not show any second-order serial correlation. These 
restrictions may be tested, see Arellano and Bond (1991). More recently, Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) show that the efficiency of the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) GMM estimator may be dramatically improved by using an extended system GMM 
estimator that uses lagged differences as instruments for equations in levels, in addition to 
lagged levels of the instruments for equations in first differences.  In this paper, we report 
both the “ordinary” GMM and "system" GMM results.  
 
4.  Data and variables 
Our main data source is a personnel register administered by the Norwegian Association of 
Local and Regional Authorities (NALRA), providing individual specific wage and hours 
information on public servants employed by counties or municipalities. Thus employees of 
the main bulk of hospitals (county-owned) are represented. The NALRA data have been 
merged with individual specific as well as hospital specific information from Statistics 
Norway. The data sources are public registers, e.g. wealth data are extracted from tax records. 
  Sixty four hospitals report information to the NALRA register. This is the majority of 
Norwegian hospitals, the most important exceptions being the National Hospital   
(Rikshospitalet) and the National Cancer Hospital (Radiumhospitalet), both run by the central 
government. However, some hospitals did not report sufficiently detailed hours information to 
the register for some (12 hospitals) or all (12 hospitals) the years in the analysis period, 1993-
1997. Thus 40 hospitals are represented in the sample. We restrict the sample to male 
physicians less than 67 years of age, who worked at one of these hospitals for at least three   10
consecutive years – the last requirement is necessary for first-differencing and instrumenting. 
The final sample then includes 1303 physicians.
5  
  (Table 1 about here) 
The variables used in the analysis are the empirical counterparts to lnhit, lnwit, sit, yit, 
and Xit, and are defined more concisely in Table 1. The specification of Xit contains family 
information, and also job and hospital characteristics. In addition to the exclusion restrictions 
discussed in the previous section, experience and two demand related variables (hospital 
occupancy rate and average hospitalization time) are used as instruments. Details regarding 
the construction of wage and hours variables can be found in the appendix. It should be noted 
that the wage and hours data in the NALRA register are collected in October each year, 
whereas other individual characteristics are observed yearly, and hospital characteristics are 
yearly averages.  
(Table 2 about here) 
Sample statistics for each year are reported in Table 2. The mean age is about 46.7 
years in 1993 and about 49.5 years in 1997, reflecting that the panel is unbalanced. The 
marriage rate is relatively stable (about 82 percent) over the five years, while the proportion 
with children less than three years of age varied from 10 to 15 percent. The average number 
of hours worked per month decreased from 181.5 in 1994 to 172.1 in 1996. We also note that 
the average wage rate increased sharply in 1996, following a particularly favorable settlement 
for physicians employed at hospitals in the central negotiations. Non-labor income (mostly 
spouse earnings) has increased steadily over the sample period from 137.5 thousand NoK in 
1993 to 162.0 thousand NoK in 1997. Net wealth has also increased steadily over the sample 
period from 82.4 thousand NoK in 1993 to 247.7 thousand NoK in 1997. These physicians 
had an average of 20 to 23 years of experience over the sample period. Sixty one to sixty three 
                                                 
5 It is well established that there are gender differences in labor market behavior. We only have data on 378 
female physicians. Regressions based on this sub-sample yielded imprecise results, and we have chosen to focus 
on the sample of males in this paper.   11
percent of these were consultant physicians, while 18 to 24 percent of them were chief 
consultant physicians. Sixty two to sixty seven percent of the hospitals were central hospitals, 
while 17 to 18 percent were county hospitals. The occupancy rate varied between 86 and 89, 
while the total number of hospital beds varied between 367 and 407. The average length of 
stay varied between 300 and 314.  
 
5.  Regression results 
(Table 3 about here) 
Table 3 presents results for the dynamic labor supply equation. The Arellano-Bond (1991) 
GMM estimator and the Blundell-Bond (1998) system GMM system estimator are reported.
6 
Columns 1-2 of Table 3 report the GMM results without external instruments, while columns 
3-4 report the GMM results using the additional instruments described in the data section and 
at the bottom of Table 3. The reported standard errors have the finite sample correction 
suggested by Windmeijer (2000) to deal with the potential finite sample bias of GMM. The 
reader is reminded that in our specification, the wage coefficients are elasticities, and that all 
the coefficients are short run.  
We first note that the specification tests are satisfactory. The tests regarding serial 
correlation reject the absence of first order, but not second order serial correlation, and the 
Sargan tests do not reject the over-identifying restrictions. The system GMM results in 
columns (2) and (4) are quite similar, both rejecting that the lagged hours coefficient is zero. 
We interpret this as a rejection of a static model in favor of a dynamic model. 
The short run wage elasticities using the system GMM estimator are in the 0.303 and 
0.342 range. These are on the high end when compared to previous cross-section results for 
physicians labor supply. The corresponding long run wage elasticities for system GMM are 
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0.55 and 0.58, with standard errors 0.20 and 0.15, respectively. Savings and other income are 
not significant for all GMM estimators. Consultant and chief physicians work less than the 
reference group. This is also the case for physicians with small children, indicating that family 
responsibilities may play a role even for male physicians. Doctors employed at large hospitals 
(measured by number of beds) work more than others, but that effect is partly offset by the 
negative effect of working at a regional hospital as compared to the reference group of smaller 
local hospitals. We also note the negative constant term, which in a differenced model implies 
a negative time trend. Thus the positive wage effect at the individual level is compatible with 
the negative trend in aggregate hours seen in Table 2. 
A possible objection to our modeling might be that taxes are nor taken explicitly into 
consideration. However, with wages measured in logs, the effect of a constant marginal tax is 
picked up by the constant term. Individual differences in the tax rate that are fixed over  time 
are swept away by first-differencing, along with the constant term. Moreover, most physicians 
in our sample have a yearly income implying the highest marginal tax rate (about 59%) for all 
years7. Since there has been no change in the relevant tax rates during this period, the 
marginal tax rate is constant for most physicians over the sample period. Excluding 
physicians with yearly income implying lower tax rates for some years had practically no 
effect on the estimated wage elasticities. 
Even though the institutional setting is different, a comparison to Rizzo and Blumenthal 
(1994) and Showalter and Thurston (1997) seems relevant. Both these studies find 
considerably lower wage elasticities than those reported here. Using the same functional form 
as in the present study, Rizzo and Blumenthal, who consider self-employed physicians, find 
an uncompensated wage elasticity for men of 0.23, and an income compensated elasticity of 
0.44. Somewhat surprisingly, we do not find any statistically significant income effects. 
                                                 
7 Only 37 physicians had yearly incomes corresponding to marginal tax rates lower than 59 percent. 4 physicians 
had lower marginal tax rates for all years, 19 physicians only the first year, while 8 physicians had lower 
marginal tax rates only for the last year.   13
Hence, we do not compute the income compensated elasticities. The lack of significance 
could be due to too little variation over time, but could also reflect differences between self-
employed and employee physicians. Showalter and Thurston focus on responses to variations 
in marginal tax rather than wage elasticities per se, but a key finding is that whereas self-
employed physicians are sensitive to the marginal tax rate, employee physicians have no 
discernible sensitivity at all. The according wage elasticities are 0.33 and 0.10, 
respectively.
8One reason that we estimate elasticities closer to 0.6 could be that the work 
schedules possibly are more flexible for the employee physicians in our sample. We have also 
estimated a static model (not reported) which is rejected by our dynamic specification. In this 
model the estimated wage elasticity (0.25) was closer to those reported in previous studies. 
Thus it cannot be ruled out that our higher estimated elasticities are not only resulting from 
institutional differences, but also from our access to panel data that allows for a richer 
dynamic specification. 
 
6.  Concluding remarks 
The literature on the behavior of physicians holding jobs at hospitals is scarce. In this study 
we have estimated the labor supply of Norwegian hospital physicians, who constitute a 
majority of the profession in that country. We have used a matched panel data set which we 
think provide fairly accurate information on wages and hours. Simply stated, our main 
conclusion is that physicians who work at hospitals behave similarly to other employees. 
Compared to previous findings, the physicians in our sample seem fairly responsive to wage 
changes. In part, this may result from the institutional setting: these physicians are ordinary 
wage earners, and their earnings – even though they clearly are in the upper part of the wage 
distribution – are lower than for many self-employed doctors. Thus they need not be 
                                                 
8 The elasticities are with respect to (1-marginal tax rate) but in their formulation the wage elasticity is identical.   14
anywhere near the backward-bending part of the labor supply curve. But having access to 
panel data and being able to control for unobserved heterogeneity, as well as estimating a 
dynamic model, may explain why our wage elasticity estimates differ from the previous 
cross-section estimates. For planners of public policy, our results are interesting from at least 
two perspectives. First, if physician services are in short supply, physicians actually do 
respond to wage increases. Second, if increasing health expenditures are a worry, 
policymakers should be aware that the fiscal effect of increasing physicians’ wages might be 
magnified by the labor supply response. 
   15
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Data appendix 
 
In this appendix we explain how wages, hours and savings are constructed. The total number 
of hours supplied by each physician is not directly reported in our data (the NALRA register). 
The amount of regular hours is given, while work outside normal hours have to be calculated 
on the basis of different overtime payments. Our data contains information on the total sum of 
two types of overtime compensation: compensation for planned (contractual) overtime (fixed 
overtime compensation) and compensation for ordinary overtime (variable overtime 
compensation). Ordinary overtime is typically used due to vacancies and sick-absence. Before 
1996, compensation for this kind of overtime was the same irrespective of working hours. 
Assistant physicians received 100 % overtime bonus, while ward and leading physicians 
received only 50 %.  Since 1996, all physicians received 100 percent compensation for the 
first 11 hours per week and 200 percent compensation for additional overtime (here additional 
overtime include both planned and ordinary overtime). Using the total amount of overtime 
payments and the hourly compensation, it is straightforward to calculate the number of 
ordinary overtime hours.  
In addition to ordinary overtime, physicians can make an agreement with the hospital 
to set an amount of hours that the physician is required to supply. Before 1996 the physicians 
were compensated at a fixed rate for this kind of contractual overtime. From 1996 the 
overtime bonus was made dependent on the amount of hours offered. The physicians receive 
50 percent compensation for the first five hours per week, 100 percent from 6 to 11 hours and 
200 percent compensation for more than 11 hours per week. Knowing the exact amount each 
physician receives as fixed overtime pay makes it a straightforward task to calculate the 
number of planed overtime hours worked. However, the amount reported in our data could 
include other kinds of regular compensation as well. Typically this is compensation for other 
types of extended working hours (like meetings or administrative work outside normal hours)   19
and this overtime might be compensated differently compared to what we have called planned 
overtime. Since we only have the total amount of fixed overtime payments, and therefore are 
unable to single out different types of overtime, we treat all overtime in the same way. To the 
extent that this possible measurement error is individual specific, first differencing eliminates 
it.  
The hourly wage is calculated by adding the monthly basic income, compensation for 
ordinary and contractual overtime, and then dividing this income by the total number of hours 
worked. Finally the wage is discounted by a price index.  
Physicians engaged in shift work have a contractual regular working hours of 35.5 
hours per week, whereas others work 37.5 hours per week. To correct for this we have 
included a dummy variable (Hour35.5) in the regressions that takes the value 1 if the 
physician is on a contract implying 35.5 hours per week, 0 otherwise. 
  Saving is constructed as net family wealth (wealth of the physician and his wife) at 
time (t) minus net family wealth at time (t-1). Information on net wealth is taken from public 
tax registers, and includes real estate, bonds, shares, options and other securities, checking 
accounts, savings and deposits accounts, personal loans, credits, etc. Net wealth might be 
undervalued, since the taxable value of real estate is considerably lower than the marked 
value. Assuming that the under valuation of net wealth is constant over this short time span, 
first differencing eliminates this problem. 
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Table 1 Variable definitions 
Lnh  Log of monthly hours 
Lnw  Log of hourly wage 
Saving  Net wealth of physician and spouse (t) – net wealth of physician and 
spouse (t-1) 
Other income  Spouse income + child benefits 
Hour35.5  Dummy=1 if the physician is on a contract implying 35.5 hours per 
week, 0 otherwise 
Experience  Years with income above basic counting unit in pension system (NoK 
37033 in 1993) 
Length of stay  Total inpatients days/number of patients (in 100) 
Occupancy rate  Total inpatient days*100/effective beds*365  
Hospital beds  Total number of beds set-up and staffed for use (in 100) 
Central hospital  Dummy=1 if working at central or regional hospital, 0 otherwise 
County hospital  Dummy=1 if working in a county hospital, 0 otherwise 
Chief consultant physician  Dummy=1 if chief consultant physician, 0 otherwise 
Consultant physician  Dummy=1 if consultant physician, 0 otherwise 
Married  Dummy=1 if married, 0 otherwise 
Children<3  Dummy=1 if having children less than 3 years of age, 0 otherwise 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Hours per month  180.75 (24.42)  181.49 (25.26)  176.08 (30.06)  172.06 (29.47)  173.52 (33.34) 
Hourly wage  186.29 (21.77)  187.42 (28.45)  191.49 (31.79)  220.89 (39.64)  220.71 (34.34) 
Other income (1000 NoK)  137.47 (115.47)  138.29 (118.03)  145.86 (120.93)  156.69 (131.05)  161.98 (142.58) 
Net wealth (1000 NoK)  82.35 (1114.13)  127.35 (1932.54)  179.87 (2153.63)  194.66 (2396.23)  247.66 (2628.01) 
Savings (1000 NoK)  -  2.23 (48.94)  6.58 (43.25)  5.03 (34.73)  3.60 (36.42) 
Hour35.5  0.73 (0.44)  0.72 (0.45)  0.71 (0.46)  0.68 (0.47)  0.67 (0.47) 
Experience  20.53 (6.11)  20.81 (6.43)  21.28 (6.83)  22.29 (8.77)  23.42 (6.78) 
Age  46.67 (8.55)  46.87 (8.70)  47.34 (8.96)  48.34 (8.77)  49.47 (8.59) 
Married  0.82 (0.38)  0.82 (0.39)  0.81 (0.39)  0.82 (0.38)  0.82 (0.39) 
Children < 3  0.15 (0.36)  0.13 (0.34)  0.12 (0.33)  0.11 (0.32)  0.10 (0.30) 
Consultant physician  0.61 (0.49)  0.61 (0.49)  0.62 (0.49)  0.65 (0.48)  0.63 (0.48) 
Chief consultant physician  0.20 (0.40)  0.18 (0.39)  0.18 (0.39)  0.19 (0.39)  0.24 (0.43) 
Central hospital  0.62 (0.49)  0.63 (0.48)  0.64 (0.48)  0.65 (0.48)  0.67 (0.47) 
County hospital  0.18 (0.38)  0.18 (0.38)  0.17 (0.37)  0.18 (0.39)  0.17 (0.38) 
Occupancy rate  88.91 (8.59)  86.63 (9.03)  87.83 (8.49)  87.83 (8.55)  87.56 (9.52) 
Hospital beds  367.46 (255.21)  385.88 (272.07)  402.53 (283.97)  406.74 (277.77)  401.59 (259.02) 
Length of stay  299.93 (30.47)  304.39 (31.71)  302.17 (27.79)  307.81 (32.53)  314.19 (33.67) 
Number of observations  1028 1216 1304 1105  995 
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Table 3 Labor supply estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  GMM GMM-SYS GMM GMM-SYS 
  Coef Std.Error  Coef Std.Error  Coef Std.Error  Coef Std.Error 
Lnh(-1) 0.238  0.167  0.450
***  0.078 0.179  0.156 0.408
*** 0.073 
Lnw 0.390
* 0.203  0.303
*** 0.099  0.543
*** 0.186  0.342
*** 0.093 
Saving  -0.001  0.001 0.001  0.001 -0.001  0.001 0.000  0.001 
Other  income  -0.007  0.007 0.001  0.001 -0.003  0.005 0.001  0.001 
Hour_35.5 -0.057
**  0.027 -0.014  0.013 -0.075
*** 0.025  -0.016  0.012 
Married  0.129  0.125 -0.023  0.016 0.067  0.095 -0.029
* 0.015 
Child<3 -0.033  0.022  -0.018
* 0.011  -0.040
** 0.019  -0.023
** 0.011 
Consultant physician  -0.046  0.037  -0.034
* 0.019  -0.075
** 0.032  -0.039
** 0.016 
Chief consultant phys.-0.051  0.047  -0.044  0.027  -0.085
** 0.042  -0.048
** 0.023 
Hospital beds  0.021
*** 0.008  0.009
*** 0.002  0.021
*** 0.007  0.008
*** 0.002 
Centr/Regional hosp  -0.211
*** 0.067  -0.040
*** 0.013  -0.199
*** 0.063  -0.040
*** 0.013 
County hospital  -0.112
**  0.052 -0.003  0.013 -0.096
** 0.046  -0.004  0.013 
Constant -0.041
*** 0.010  1.316
** 0.634  -0.046
*** 0.008  1.340
*** 0.519 
T1995     -0.047
*** 0.006      -0.046
*** 0.006 
T1996 -0.026  0.031  -0.107
***  0.017 -0.047  0.029 -0.113
*** 0.016 
T1997 0.060
*** 0.013  -0.077
*** 0.018  0.061
































Observations  3038 4341 3038 4341 
Number of individuals: 1303 
All results are based on a 2-step GMM. Standard errors use the Windmeijer’s finite sample correction. 
(1), (2): No additional instruments. (3), (4): Experience, length of stay, occupancy rate are used as additional instruments.  
 